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NOTES
LABOR LAW-UNIONS--The National Labor Relations
Board's Role in Examining the Use of Union
Dues Collected Pursuant to a Union
Security Agreement
Under section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA), a majority union and an employer are permitted to enter
into a so-called "union security agreement," which requires all employees in the bargaining unit to tender to the union as a condition
of continued employment "the periodic dues and the initiation fees
uniformly required" by the union of its members.' As long as an
employee-whether or not he is a member of the union-is willing
to pay the proper initiation fees and the "periodic dues.., uniformly
required," the union commits an unfair labor practice if it threatens
to request or in fact obtains his discharge. 2 Several cases have arisen
1. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1964). This section provides that nothing in the NLRA
shall preclude a labor organization which is the representative of the employees in an
appropriate bargaining unit from making an agreement with an employer "to require
as a condition of employment membership therein ... ." Standing alone, this language
would seem to allow a union the right to have an employee discharged from employment for failure to acquire and maintain union membership. However, this broad
language of section 8(a)(3) is qualified by a proviso which states that an employer cannot discriminate against a nonunion employee if membership was denied or terminated
for reasons other than the failure of the employee to tender the periodic dues and the
initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership. NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734 (1963); Radio Officers Union v.
NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1954).
This provision has led many employers and unions, to enter into union security
agreements, which, as used in this Note, include union shop agreements, which
require union "membership" as a condition of continued employment; and agency
shop agreements, which do not require membership in the union but do require that
those not wishing to become union members pay to the union as a condition of continued employment an amount equal to the members' dues.
Compare § 8(a)(3) with § 8(b)(2) [29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (1964)], which makes it an
unfair labor practice for a labor organization to cause or attempt to cause an employer
to discriminate against an employee for nonmembership in the union where membership has been denied or terminated for reasons other than the failure of the employee
to tender proper dues and fees.
2. Because section 7 of the NLRA [29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964)] grants employees the
right to refrain from union activities except to the extent that this right is affected by
a security agreement permitted by section 8(a)(3), and because an employee's maximum obligation under a section 8(a)(3) agreement is to acquire and maintain membership to the extent of paying proper initiation fees and periodic dues to the union, it
follows that section 7 establishes the right to refrain from union activities except for
the obligation to pay proper dues and fees under a security agreement. Thus, it is
well established that union threats to request the discharge of an employee because
he has refused to pay to the union sums other than proper dues and fees "restrain" or
"coerce" employees in the exercise of their section 7 rights and thus constitute a violation of section 8(b)(1)(A) [29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A) (1964)]. See, e.g., Marlin Rockwell
Corp., 114 N.L.R.B. 553, 555-56, 562 (1955); Eclipse Lumber Co., 95 N.L.R.B. 464, 473
(1951). See also NLRB v. Spector Freight System, Inc., 273 F.2d 272 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 362 U.S. 962 (1960); Namm's Inc., 102 N.L.R.B. 466, 469 (1953).
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in which a union has threatened to have an employee discharged for
nonpayment of its monthly fees, part of which were to be refunded
if the employee attended monthly union meetings. In such a situation, the issue presented is whether levies which are to be refunded
for attending union meetings properly come with the meaning of
"periodic dues... uniformly required." In two decisions concerning
this issue, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) decided in
1962 and 1963 that the refund element precluded the levies from being "uniformly required," and therefore that they were not collectible as a condition of employment. 3 However, in a recent case,
Local 171, Pulp Workers (Boise Cascade Corp.),4 the NLRB rejected
this analysis.
In Boise Cascade the local union amended its bylaws to provide
for an increase in monthly dues from three dollars and seventy-five
cents to six dollars, with the proviso that two dollars would be refunded to persons attending monthly meetings. 5 Petitioner, a member of the union, became delinquent in his dues6 and the union informed him that it would request the employer to discharge him
pursuant to the union security agreement unless both the arrearage
and a new initiation fee were paid. The employee paid the requested
sums, but subsequently filed an unfair labor practice complaint with
3. In Leece-Neville Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 56 (1962), enforced as modified, 330 F.2d 242
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 819 (1964), the NLRB reiterated the proposition that
to be "uniformly required," dues must be "charged to all members alike, and that any
distinction [must] be based upon a reasonable classification." The NLR1B reasoned
that the effect of the refund arrangement in question was to require employees who
did not attend union meetings to pay more money to the union than employees who
did attend and noted that a "classification of employees based upon attendance or
nonattendance . .. [is] not a reasonable classification." 140 N.L.R.B. at 59. In United
Packinghouse, 142 N.L.R.B. 768 (1963), the Board struck down a similar refund arrangement on the authority of Leece-Neville.
4. 165 N.L.R.B. No. 97 (June 23, 1967) [hereinafter Boise Cascade]. Excerpts from
the Board's opinion may be found in 1967 CCH NLRB Dec.
21,547.
5. The amendment did not specify whether only members of the union who attended meetings would receive refunds or whether all employees in the bargaining
unit were eligible to receive them. It merely stated: "The monthly dues of the Local
Union are $6.00 per member with $2.00 refunded for monthly meeting attendance."
Trial Examiner's Decision at 3. The propriety of the amendment procedure was not
challenged before the NLRB. Boise Cascade at 1 n.2.
6. The petitioner did not at any time tender less than six dollars as monthly dues.
Although the issue of tender was not raised before the NLR.B, the trial examiner had
rejected the union's contention that a tender of four dollars and a refusal thereof by
the union was necessary to establish an unfair labor practice. Although the trial examiner did not fully explain the basis for this rejection, he noted that "it is evident
that the members, being directed by the by-laws to pay the sum of $6.00 in monthly
dues in order to remain 'in good standing,' were expected . . . to do so." Trial Examiner's Decision at 5. It is well established that an employee need not make a tender
of "periodic dues" where the circumstances indicate that such a tender would almost
certainly be rejected by the union. E.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 96 N.L.R.B. 522, 525
(1951), enforced sub nom., NLRB v. Machinists, Local 504, 203 F.2d 173 (9th Cir.
1953); Eclipse Lumber Co., 95 N.L.R.B. 464, 467 (1951), enforced, 199 F.2d 684 (9th
Cir. 1952).
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the NLRB alleging that the union had threatened to have him discharged for nonpayment of levies which could not be considered
"dues," and that the union had thereby unlawfully "restrained" or
"coerced" him in the exercise of his right under section 7 of the
NLRA7 to "refrain" from union activities. Overruling its two prior
decisions, the NLRB held that the union had not committed an unfair labor practice." Thus, a union acting under a union security
agreement may threaten to cause the discharge of an employee for
nonpayment of "dues," part of which will be "refunded" to employees who attend union meetings.
The NLRB held that such levies were in fact "uniformly required." 9 However, apparently reluctant to rest its holding merely
upon this determination, the NLRB devoted most of its opinion to
a discussion of the use to which the disputed portions of the levies,
once collected, were to be put. The NLRB emphasized that granting
cash "rewards" to employees who attended meetings was a commendable "use" of the collected funds because of the importance of
stimulating attendance and participation at union meetings. 10 Thus,
the nature of the use to which levies are applied apparently must
be examined in determining whether such levies can be considered
"periodic dues... uniformly required."
Although the Supreme Court has held that there are limitations
on the uses to which a union subject to the Railway Labor Act
7. Section 7 of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964), guarantees to all employees the
right to refrain from concerted union activities except to the extent that such right is
affected by an agreement under section 8(a)(3) requiring "membership" in the union
as a condition of continued employment. Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the NLRA makes it an
unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents "to restrain or coerce ...
employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7." 29 U.S.c. § 158(b)(1)(A)
(1964). The employee also charged that the union had violated section 8(b)(2) of the
NLRA [29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (1964)], which makes it an unfair labor practice to cause
or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an employee for nonmembership in a union where membership has been denied or terminated for reasons other
than the failure or the employee to tender proper dues and fees. However, the trial examiner found no such violation. Trial Examiner's Decision at 5. The NLRB adopted
pro forma the trial examiner's recommendation that the allegations of the complaint
pertaining to section 8(b)(2) be dismissed. Boise Cascade at 1 n.1.
8. Two members of the NLRB dissented, but the majority expressly overruled two
earlier decisions, Packinghouse Workers, Local 673, 142 NL.R.B. 768 (1963) and LeeceNeville Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 56 (1962), enforced as modified, 330 F.2d 242 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 819 (1964), to the extent that they held that a union may not request
the discharge of an employee for nonpayment of sums which are to be refunded for
attendance at union meetings. The majority did not refer to the similar case of Electric Auto-Lite Co., 92 N.L.R.B. 1073 (1950), enforced, 196 F.2d 500 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 344 U.S. 823 (1952).
9. The NLRB stated, "Each member was assessed an equal amount of dues, and
each member was accorded an equal opportunity to share in the reward offered for
giving of his time to necessary Union affairs. The amount of dues required of members was uniform; the method of collecting such dues was uniformly applied." Boise
Cascade at 4.
10. Boise Cascade at 3-4.
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(RLA) may put dues money," the NLRB, with a few limited exceptions, has never inquired into the propriety of the use of funds collected as dues by unions subject to the NLRA. 2 Thus, the decision
in Boise Cascade seems to raise for the first time the question of the
nature and extent of limitations, if any, which the NLRB will impose upon a union's expenditure of dues money collected as a condition of employment under the NLRA.
NLRB investigation into the use of dues seems to be supported
both by legislative history and past cases. Under the NLRA as
originally enacted, majority unions were permitted to use union
security agreements to require all employees in the bargaining unit
to acquire and maintain actual membership in the union as a condition of employment.' 3 Because these unions had unrestricted control over the requirements for membership, they had the power to
make continued employment dependent upon compliance with
union rules and maintenance of favor with union officials. In order
to extirpate the abuses which resulted from this concentration of
power,14 Congress in 1947 granted employees the right to refrain
from union activities and made it an unfair labor practice for a
union either to threaten to impair an employee's job status or to
cause an employer to discriminate against an employee because he
refrained from such activities.' However, at the same time, Congress recognized that a union is required to represent all the employees in the bargaining unit whether or not such employees are
11. Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks v. Allen, 373 U.S. 113 (1963); International Assn. of
Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
12. In several instances where unions have attempted to collect special sums in
addition to their regular dues, these additional sums, even though uniformly levied
and periodically required, have been held not to be "dues" on the ground that they
were to be used for purposes other than those authorized by the NLRA. E.g., Teamsters, Local 959 (RCA Service Co.), 167 N.L.R.B. No. 148, (Oct. 25, 1967) [decided after
Boise Cascade]; Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 1925, 1926 (1954). See
NLRB v. Food Fair Stores, Inc., 307 F.2d 3, 11 (3d Cir. 1962). See also text accompanying notes 18-23 infra.
13. National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(3), 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(3) (1964).
14. An example of such abuse can be seen in one instance where a union member
saw a union steward hit a foreman and, having been subpoenaed to appear in court,
testified to what he had seen. Subsequently, the union expelled him and the employer was compelled to discharge him under a closed shop contract. 93 CONG. REC.
4193 (1947). In another instance two employees were expelled by the union and deprived of their jobs because they had refused to buy chances in a lottery conducted by
the union. 93 CONG. R~c. 5110 (1947).
15. The Taft-Hartley amendments included: the provision in section 7 enabling
employees to refrain from union activities except to the extent that they may be subject to security agreements under section 8(a)(3); the provision in section 8(a)(3) prohibiting an employer from discriminating against an employee under a security agreement unless the employee has failed to tender proper dues and fees (see note 1
supra); all of sections 8(b)(1)(A), and (b)(2) [29 U.S.C. §§ 158(b)(1)(A), 158(b)(2)
(1964)].
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also union members; 16 accordingly, since all the employees in the
bargaining unit benefited from union representation, Congress al-

lowed unions to require that all employees help defray the expenses
of collective bargaining and other closely related activities the benefits of which inured to the whole unit. A balance was struck between
the individual employee's right to refrain from union activity and
the union's interest in collecting funds to carry on its necessary
operations. It was to deal with the problem of so-called "free riders"
that unions were permitted to include as part of their collective bargaining agreements security clauses requiring union activity to the

limited extent of payment of uniformly required periodic dues and
initiation fees. 17 Implicit in this concern is a congressional intent
16. The duty of a union to represent fairly all the employees in a bargaining unit
is derived from section 9 of the NLRA [29 U.S.C. § 159 (1964)], which grants powers
of exclusive representation to a majority union. See Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 328 U.S.
248 (1944); Steele v. Louisville & N. Ry., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
17. The report of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare stated: "It
seems to us that these amendments remedy the most serious abuses of compulsory
union membership and yet give employers and unions who feel that such agreements
promoted stability by eliminating 'free riders' the right to continue such arrangements." S. RP. No. 105, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. 7 (1947). The Joint Committee on LaborManagement Relations so understood the section. Its report states:
When Congress abolished the closed shop and permitted the union shop with the
safeguard that it might not be used to deny employment to anyone whose lack of
membership was occasioned by anything other than refusal to pay a reasonable
initiation fee and regular membership dues, it was attempting to eliminate the
abuses of compulsory membership while still permitting labor organizations to
enjoy a form of union security....
In permitting a limited form of compulsory membership, Congress recognized
that the "free rider" argument had some validity.
S. R-EF. No. 986, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, at 52 (1948).
On the Senate floor on May 9, 1947, Senator Taft said:
Mr. President, while I think of it, I should like to say that the rule adopted by the
committee is substantially the rule now in effect in Canada. Apparently by a
decision of the justices of the Supreme Court of Canada in an arbitration case,
the present rule in Canada is that there can be a closed shop or union shop, and
the union does not have to admit an employee who applied for membership, but
the employee must nevertheless pay dues, even though he does not join the union.
If he pays the dues without joining the union, he has the right to be employed. That, in effect, is a kind of tax, if you please, for union support if the
union is the recognized bargaining agent for all the men, but there is no constitutional way by which we can do that in the United States.
I may say that the argument for the union shop and against abolishing the
dosed shop, is that if there is not a dosed shop those not in the union will get a
free ride, that the union does the work, gets the wages raised, then the man who
does not pay dues rides along freely without any expense to himself. Under the
Canadian rule, and under the rule of the committee, we pretty well take care of
that argument. There is not much argument left.
93 CONG. Rxc. 4887 (1947).
On another occasion Senator Taft said:
The bill further provides that if the man is admitted to the union, and subsequently is fired from the union for any reason other than nonpayment of dues,
then the employer shall not be required to fire that man. In other words, what
we do, in effect, is to say that no one can get a free ride in such a shop. That
meets one of the arguments for the union shop. The employee has to pay the dues.
93 CONG. REO. 3837 (1947). For further debate on this point, see 93 CONG. REc. 3558
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that dues money should be used in certain ways; thus, it appears
proper for the NLRB to determine if levies are properly dues, not
merely by looking to see if they are "periodic" and "uniform," but
also by determining whether they are being applied for the purposes
Congress apparently intended.
This approach of looking to the "use" of money seems to have
further support in two United States Supreme Court decisions
which, although arising under the RLA, concerned an analogous
problem. In the first case, InternationalAssociation of Machinists v.
Street, 8 the Court held that a union may not use money collected
as dues to support political causes over an employee's objection. 19
The Court specifically denied that the improper use caused the
money collected to lose its character as dues; rather it concluded that
although the exaction was properly collected at the time, an employee could have restitution if the union later put the money to an
20
improper use.
However, in the second RLA case, Brotherhood of Railway
Clerks v. Allen,2 ' decided two years later, the Court seemed to retreat from its position in Street. The Court indicated that an exaction may not be collected as "dues," and hence made a condition of
employment, if the subsequent use is improper. Allen involved the
same question of using union funds to support certain political
causes, and the Supreme Court suggested that in such cases the trial
court should determine the percentage of total union expenditures
applied to political purposes. Once this percentage was determined,
the Court indicated that a decree could properly order both restitution of that portion of the dues improperly used and a reduction of
future "dues" by the same percentage. 22 Thus, the Court at least
intimated that these levies were not the type of "dues" payment
which could be made a condition of continued employment.2 3
(1947) (remarks of Representative Robison.) See also Radio Officers Union v. NLRB,
347 U.S. 17, 41 (1954); Union Starch & Ref. Co., 87 N.L.R.B. 779 (1949), enforced, 186
F.2d 1008 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 815 (1951).
18. 367 U.S. 740 (1961).

19. The Court relied heavily on legislative history of the RLA in concluding that
Congress enabled unions to collect dues from all employees in order "to force employees to share the costs of negotiating and administering collective agreements, and
the costs of the adjustment and settlement of disputes," and stated that the use of
dues to suggest candidates for public office and to advance political programs was therefore not a proper use. 367 U.S. at 763-68.

20. 367 U.S. at 771-75.
21. 373 U.S. 113 (1963).
22. 373 U.S. at 122.
23. It should be pointed out that because of certain differences between the RLA

and the NLRA, the Supreme Court might not extend the Street-Allen doctrine to the
NLRA. It might be argued that the Court only interpreted the RLA as it did in those
decisions to avoid the necessity of deciding whether the use of exacted money for
political causes over an employee's objection violates the employee's rights under the
first amendment. In Railway Employees' Dept. v. Hanson, 351 US. 225 (1956), the
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In addition to the legislative history and the two RLA cases,
both the NLRB and the courts have inquired into the "use" of
union-collected funds to determine if levies can be considered "dues"
in several analogous contexts. For example, unions have occasionally
charged a particular periodic levy as dues for some period of time,
and have then added to this regular amount another periodic levy
earmarked for a certain purpose, such as financing a new union
building or establishing a special strike fund. In holding that these
additional levies were not dues, the NLRB indicated that since these
additional amounts were not levied for the purpose of defraying the
cost of "maintaining" the union in its capacity as collective bargaining agent, they were "assessments" rather than dues. Thus, they
could not be collected as a condition of employment.2 4 Although
these cases involved exactions over and above what had previously
been the "normal" monthly charge, it seems that an analogous approach could be taken in cases in which a portion of the "normal"
monthly exaction has been applied to an improper use. Thus, it is
submitted that the NLRB had ample authority to support its inquiry in Boise Cascade into the "use" of union levies to determine
if in fact they can be considered to be dues which are "uniformly
required."
Assuming that the NLRB has the right to inquire into the use
of funds collected as union dues, difficult issues are presented in determining what kinds of uses should be considered proper.
One obvious approach-suggested by the congressional interest
in forcing "free-riders" to pay their share of union representation
expenses, 25 by the Street and Allen decisions under the RLA,28 and
by the NLRB's decisions under the NLRA holding that particular
union levies were "assessments" rather than "dues"27is that dues
money may be collected and used only as necessary to support the
union in its capacity as collective bargaining agent. Specifically, there
is language in the Supreme Court's opinions in Street and Allen
which seems to suggest that union expenditures, to be proper, must
Court had held that because the RLA expressly allows union shop agreements notwithstanding state laws, the federal statute authorizing such agreements is "the only
governmental action on which the Constitution operates." 351 U.S. at 232. However,
since § 14(b) of the NLRA [29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (1964)] allows state law to prohibit union
security agreements, governmental action may be absent, with the result that under
the NLRA expenditure of exacted dues for political purposes may present no constitutional problems. With no constitutional issue in the background the Court may not
feel impelled to interpret the NLRA as prohibiting use of dues money for political
purposes.
24. Teamsters, Local 959 (RCA Service Co.), 167 N.L.R.B. No. 148 (Oct. 25, 1967)
[decided after Boise Cascade]; Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 1925, 1926
(1954). See also NLRB v. Food Fair Stores, Inc., 307 F.2d 3, 11 (3d Cir. 1962).
25. See notes 16-17 supra and accompanying text.
26. See notes 18-23 supra and accompanying text.

27. See note 24 supra and accompanying text.
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be related to the costs of collective bargaining. 28 However, such an
approach would seem unduly narrow. Not only have unions never
been so confined, but also, in Street the Court specifically reserved
the question of the propriety of union "expenditures for activities
in the area between the costs which led directly to the complaint as
to 'free riders' [that is, the costs of representing all employees in the
bargaining unit in collective bargaining], and the expenditures to
support union political activities."'2 9 Furthermore, in 1958 the
Senate considered and rejected a proposed amendment which would
have explicitly limited the use of dues collected under a union security agreement to defraying the expenses of collective bargaining
and related activities.30 In rejecting the proposed limitation, the
Senate seems implicitly to have indicated its belief that the TaftHartley amendments to the NLRA, in their original form, were not
intended to provide such a limitation upon the use of dues money.
In developing a standard for determining what kinds of uses of dues
money-beyond simply meeting the expenses of collective bargaining-are permissible, two separate but related considerations seem
to be controlling.
First, despite the rejection of the proposed amendment in 1958,
the broad intention of Congress in enacting the Taft-Hartley amendments still appears to have been that employees should receive the
benefit of expenditures of funds which they must pay as a condition
of continued employment. As indicated above, 31 passage of the
statutory provisions enabling unions to collect dues from all employees in the unit was motivated by a desire to prevent employees
from receiving benefits for which they did not pay. This legislative
intent is keyed to the benefit which employees receive; thus, even if
a union may spend dues money for purposes other than defraying
the expenses of collective bargaining, the dues money which an employee is required to pay must at least be32 used to benefit him to
provide benefits which are available to him.

28. In International Assn. of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 763-64 (1961), the
Court stated that "[t]he conclusion to which this history [of this part of the RLA]
clearly points is that § 2, l1th contemplated compulsory unionism to force employees
to share the costs of negotiating and administering collective agreements, and the costs
of the adjustment and settlement of disputes." Similar statements would be equally
applicable to the NLRA.
29. 367 U.S. at 769. The Court thus made it clear that it "express[ed] no view as
to other union expenditures objected to by an employee and not made to meet the
costs of negotiation and administration of collective [bargaining] agreements .... "
367 U.S. at 769-70. An additional argument that the Supreme Court did not intend to
limit union expenditures solely to collective bargaining costs is indicated by the fact
that the Court stressed that spending money collected as dues for political purposes
over the objections of members directly infringed upon their right of dissent. See International Assn. of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 765-70 (1961).
30. 104 CONG. Ric. 11214-24, 11330-47 (1958).
31. See notes 16-17 supra and accompanying text.
32. Although the question of the extent to which all employees in a unit are en-
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Of course, it is too simplistic to assert that the union expenditure
must provide benefits which are "available" to all employees in the
bargaining unit. A more effective test of the propriety of the expenditure would be that it should provide tangible benefits which
are of the type normally associated with job or union activities.
Such an approach would not permit unions to spend dues money
collected as a condition of employment on items which do not bear
a reasonable relation to employees' job-related concerns or which
confer only remote or intangible benefits upon employees. For
example, a union contribution out of dues money to a local charity
should not be found proper on the ground that all employees benefit from the improved public image of the union. Even if the union
argued that this new status in the community strengthened its bargaining position with the employer, this "benefit" seems too intangible to justify an expenditure of dues paid by all employees in
the unit as a condition of continued employment. Similarly, even if
the union's contribution allows each employee to secure a membership in the charity-perhaps in the form of season tickets to a civic
theater or concert series or just a donor's card or certificate-at a
reduced rate, such a benefit is only remotely related to the workers'
job activities and the expenditure should not be permissible.
The second consideration in determining which expenditures
are proper relates to the right of all employees to refrain from
union activities, and to the congressional intent to prevent unions
from using security agreements to compel employees to participate
in union activities or fulfill union obligations other than the obligation to pay "periodic dues."S3 Just as a union cannot lawfully use
titled to receive the benefits of all union expenditures has not received any direct
attention from the NLRB or the courts, a few decisions shed some light on the matter.
For example, in NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734 (1963), in which the
Supreme Court upheld the agency shop, the Court discussed the benefits which would
be received by those employees who chose merely to pay dues to the union and not to
become members of the union. The court noted that these employees, although not
entitled under the union bylaws to attend meetings or to have a voice in the internal
affairs of the union, would "in accordance with union custom . . . share in union
expenditures for strike benefits, educational and retired member benefits .... ." 373
U.S. at 737. Although the court did not explicitly state that such benefits had to be
given to all employees in the unit, its observation that all employees would receive
the benefits seems to imply that they had a right to receive them. In addition, the
majority opinion in the NLRB decision appears also to have assumed that nonmember employees who were required to pay the same dues and fees as members are
entitled to the same benefits as members. See General Motors Corp., 133 N.L.R.B. 451,
456 n.12 (1961).
33. In Radio Officers Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 40 (1954), the Supreme Court
stated:
The policy of the Act is to insulate employees' jobs from their oganizational
rights. Thus §§ 8(a)(3) and 8(b)(2) were designed to allow employees to freely
exercise their right to join unions, be good, bad, or indifferent members, or abstain from joining any union without imperiling their livelihood.
It has been held that a union cannot harm or threaten to harm an employee's job
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its security agreement to enforce payment of a union imposed
"fine," 3 4 so it would seem that it should not be able to "use" dues
already collected to coerce an employee in the exercise of his right
to refrain from union activities.
Thus, the "use" of dues by the union in Boise Cascade to provide
"refunds" to employees who attended union meetings dearly seems
to be improper. The impropriety results from the fact that collection
and subsequent refunding of sums to employees present at the meetings has the same coercive effect upon those who choose not to attend
as would ordinary fines for nonattendance. In each case, in order to
induce participation in a union activity, the union requires the
employee who exercises his right to refrain from the activity to pay
the union an amount not paid by those employees who accede to
union demands. And just as conditioning the receipt of cash "rewards" upon attendance at union meetings seems improper in
Boise Cascade, so in any case it seems improper for a union to provide or to withhold the benefit from the use of dues money in order
to induce compliance with union rules or participation in union
activities.
Thus, a proper standard for the use of dues money would appear
to require that dues money be used to provide tangible, job-related
benefits, available to all employees in the unit, and that such availability not be conditioned upon compliance with union obligations.
Under such a standard unions would be able to spend dues money
to provide all employees in the unit with such benefits as health and
accident insurance, educational assistance programs, retirement
status as a means of inducing him to swear an oath of allegiance to the union [Union

Starch & Ref. Co., 87 N.L.R.B. 779 (1949), enforced, 186 F.2d 1008 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 342 U.S. 815 (1951)], to attend meetings (id.), to strike [NLRB v. Bell Aircraft
Corp., 206 F.2d 235 (2d Cir. 1953)], to march in a picket line [Local 450, Operating
Engrs., 122 N.L.R.B. 564, 567-68 (1958), enforced as modified, 281 F.2d 313 (5th Cir.
1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 909 (1961)], or to give up membership in another local
[Pape Broadcasting Co., 104 N.L.R.B. 29 (1953), enforced as modified, 217 F.2d 197

(5th Cir. 1954)].
34. E.g., Injection Molding Co., 104 N.L.R.B. 639 (1953), enforced as modified, 211
F.2d 59 (8th Cir. 1954); Electric Auto-Lite Co., 92 N.L.R.B. 1073 (1950), enforced, 196
F.2d 500 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 823 (1952); Pen Workers, Local 19593, 91
N.L.R.B. 883 (1950).
The range of union conduct which has been held to be an unfair labor practice is
suggested by the following decisions: NLRB v. Bell Aircraft Corp., 206 F.2d 235 (2d
Cir. 1953) [union attempted to prevent employer from promoting employee]; Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 727 (1954) [temporary discharge from job
followed by dropping of employee to bottom of seniority list]; Local 479, Amalgamated
Clothing Workers, 151 N.L.R.B. 555 (1965) [threatened deprivation of insurance coverage purchased out of funds provided by the employer].
On the subject of union discipline, see generally Summers, The Law of Union Discipline: What the Courts Do in Fact, 70 YAm L.J. 175 (1960); Summers, Legal Limitations on Union Discipline, 64 HAav L. Rav. 1049 (1951); Note, Union Disciplinary
Power and Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the National Labor Relations Act: Limitations on the
Immunity Doctrine, 41 N.Y.U. L. Rxv. 584 (1966).
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benefits, and the like, even though provision of such benefits would
not be strictly related to the union's role as collective bargaining
agent. These benefits, which employees might not otherwise obtain
for themselves, are socially desirable, and they may also be purchased
more cheaply through group plans than on an individual basis. Admittedly, if a particular employee chooses not to apply for tuition
assistance from a union-sponsored educational program, for example,
he would not be benefited by the union expenditures to the same
extent as are those employees who do participate; but at least the
benefits would be freely available to the employee.
At this point it is instructive to consider the propriety of several
other examples of union spending. Expenditures for strike benefits
would seem to be a proper use of dues money, even if all the employees in the unit did not receive them. Although receipt of strike
benefits presumably would be conditioned upon participation in the
strike, such benefits, unlike a fining arrangement or the "refunds"
in Boise Cascade, would seem not to be designed so much to coerce
or induce participation in union activities, but rather as a partial
substitute for loss of wages during the strike a5 In that respect, strike
benefits are certainly tangible and job-related. Moreover, it might
be argued that even if use of dues money to provide strike benefits
is deemed to "coerce" the employees in the exercise of their right
to refrain from striking, nevertheless such an expenditure should
be permissible because of its relationship to the collective bargaining process. It is undisputed that unions can collect dues money to
defray the expenses of negotiating a collective bargaining agreement, and payment of strike benefits is arguably necessary to make
a strike or the threat of a strike an effective economic weapon which
will enable a union to negotiate a favorable collective bargaining
agreement.36 Of course, any benefit which can be tied to the collective bargaining process itself is job-related, although it is possible to
differ about whether the benefit accruing to all the employees in
35. Cf. United States v. Kaiser, 363 U.S. 299 (1960), where it was held that a jury
could find that under the circumstance of the case strike benefits had been conferred
upon the respondent as a "gift," and that, therefore, they were excluded from income
for income-tax purposes under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. The Court emphasized the evidence that the benefits were granted simply on the basis of need and that
they were "not a recompense for striking." 363 U.S. at 304. A different situation would
seem to be presented if a union conditioned receipt of strike assistance upon performance of picket duty. But note that the Supreme Court in NLRB v. General Motors,
373 U.S. 734 (1963), mentioned that "strike benefits" were available to all employees
in the bargaining unit without distinguishing between those benefits given only to
those who join in picketing. See note 32 supra.
36. The same argument might even be extended to provisions of cash awards for
attending meetings. It might be argued that attendance is necessary to enable the
union to function effectively and that cash awards are necessary to achieve meaningful
attendance. However, attendance at meeting would hardly seem to be as essential to
the successful functioning of the union in its capacity as collective bargaining agent
as would be the ability to carry on a strike.
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the unit in the foregoing example is tangible enough to justify the
expenditure. Another example of union spending which might produce rather intangible benefits would be bearing the expense of
union officials' testimony before state and federal legislative committees and administrative bodies. Much of this testimony is clearly
job-related in the most basic sense: it involves attempts to secure
favorable legislation regarding wages, hours, and working conditions. Thus, while the immediate benefit accruing to individual
employees may be rather intangible, such expenditures should
probably be permittedT On the other hand, use of dues money to
make political contributions would seem to be improper not only
because any benefit to all the employees would not be tangible and
immediate, but also because any direct relationship to job-connected
concerns would be highly speculative. A different problem would be
encountered if a union established a job training program in order
to develop a particular skill in a number of employees in the bargaining unit. In such a case those employees who already possessed
the skill might complain that as a practical matter the benefits from
the use of their dues money were not available to them. Even so, in
the absence of any coercion of their rights to refrain from union
activity and in view of a substantial interest of other members of the
union in receiving this specifically job-related training, such use of
dues money would appear to be permissible.
Comparing all of these examples, it is apparent that there should
be a weighing process used in assessing the nature of the benefits
which union use of dues money is alleged to provide. If the benefits
are clearly job-related, they can be less tangible-that is, less concrete as regards the individual employee-and the union spending
can thus be upheld. Conversely, although a benefit is physically
available to each individual employee-as are the concert tickets
mentioned earlier-if it bears no reasonable relation to job or union
activities, the expenditure to produce it is improper. The basic
premise of the standard-that the use of dues money should benefit
the employees required to pay it-does preclude a union from using
dues money for some projects which may be of benefit to the community, but which are at most of only incidental benefit to the
employees in the unit. Thus, it would seem that unions could not
spend dues money on such projects as local hospitals, community
gardens, or college construction. This is so despite the fact that the
37. The possibility exists that expenditures for such testimony could be found improper. If a union official goes to Washington to testify in hearings on a proposed
bill changing reporting requirements for union officers, the direct relationship to job
concerns of employees in the bargaining unit does not exist. In such a case, given the
fact that our hypothetical employee is not a full-fledged union member, it is clear
that he receives no benefit from having a union official testify about a bill making it
less onerous to be a union official.

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 67

directors of publicly held corporations, an obvious analogy, can make
such contributions or gifts out of corporate funds without fear of
having their actions declared ultra vires. 38 The obvious distinction
is that the dissatisfied shareholder has an operative free market in
which to dispose of his shares, whereas the employee who is unhappy
with his union's use of dues money has no such recourse. He has a
great deal invested in his job and the location of his family; it is
very difficult for an employee to disassociate himself from a union
which, although it is his collective bargaining representative, pursues
spending policies with which he disagrees.
Once it has been determined that inquiry should be made into
the use of union levies and that a particular use is improper, the
question of the proper remedy is presented. If the intended use of
a specific portion of the dues money is known from the outset, as in
Boise Cascade, it seems relatively simple to excuse an employee from
paying the improper portions and to find that a union which attempts to use its security agreement to collect these portions has
committed an unfair labor practice under section 8(b)(1)(A) of the
NLRA. The section 8(b)(1)(A) violation results from the union
"coercing" payment of funds which are not properly dues. To show
such coercion, however, it would not be necessary for an employee
to withhold the portion of the dues that he thinks will be improperly
spent and thus risk his job security if he is later proved wrong or if
the amount withheld was too large. Rather, as the NLRB indicated
in Boise Cascade, the employee could pay the entire amount "under
protest," and then bring his unfair labor practice charge before the
NLRB.3 9 This approach of calling the collection of dues an unfair
labor practice where the money is improperly used would give real
meaning to the type of rights announced by the Supreme Court in
the Street and Allen decisions; an employee could effectively protest what he considers improper union expenditures without jeopardizing his job status.
However, a far more difficult problem arises where the union
accumulates dues money over a period of several years (or even sev38. The modern trend of decision is to expand the interpretation of a corporation's
incidental powers to include the right to make charitable donations within reasonable
limits. A. P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 13 NJ. 145, 98 A.2d 581, appeal dismissed, 346
U.S. 861 (1953). See Carey v. Corporations Commr., 168 Okla. 487, 33 P.2d 788 (1934),

Annot., 39 A.L.R.2d 1194 § 2(a) (1955); cf. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459,
170 N.W. 668 (1919).
39. Paying the dues "under protest" appears to be sanctioned in the Boise Cascade
decision since the employee never paid less than the six dollar amount, but paid the
entire amount under protest. See note 6 supra. However, neither the NLRB nor the
trial examiner directly relied on this method of challenging the union collection;
rather, its acceptance by the NLRB is evidenced by the fact that the NLRB apparently
approved of the method. See Boise Cascade at 2.
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eral months), as was apparently done in Street and Allen, and then
uses the money improperly. It would appear conceptually difficult
to say that such use relates back and converts the original collection
into an improper and unlawful one. Even if this were done, there
would be no showing of "coercion" at the time of the collection,
not to mention the fact that the six-month statute of limitations
probably would have run. 40 Since there could be no unfair labor
practice charge filed, the employee would have to object to the
expenditure itself, and, as is the case with a railway employee under
Street and Allen, he would have to sue in state court to prevent such
use or for restitution. This costly process has all but eliminated
challenges to improper union expenditures under the RLA, and
would undoubtedly have the same effect upon employees under the
NLRA. It is obvious that in such a situation the undercutting of an
employee's right to refrain from union activities, and the impropriety of the "use," is no less than in the case in which a portion of
the levy is earmarked for an improper use or such use is otherwise
foreseeable at the time of collection of the exactions. To allow an
employee to challenge such an expenditure as an unfair labor practice under section 8(b)(1)(A), it only seems necessary to say that any
union expenditure during a particular period is financed first out
of currently collected dues. This approach would allow the employee to pay his dues "under protest" and would provide him with
an effective challenge to the use of the dues money before the
NLRB. If this approach or a similar one were not employed, it
seems that the Boise Cascade reasoning could only apply where the
intended use of dues is known before the money is collected. And,
if that were the case, unions could easily circumvent employee challenges to their expenditure of dues collected pursuant to security
agreements.
In either situation, if a violation of section 8(b)(1)(A) is found,
an employee should be given restitution of the portion of his payment which was improperly used4 ' and a cease and desist order
should be entered enjoining the union from making any further pro40. NLRA § 10(b), 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1964).
41. In the case where an unfair labor practice is found because of collection of dues
for improper uses, the NLRB can probably grant reimbursement of the improperly
collected portions of the dues. See Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 110 NLRB 1925
(1954), where the NLRB provided reimbursement of improperly collected assessments.
See also Packinghouse Workers, Local 673, 142 NLRB 768 (1963)-one of the cases
involving a refund system like that in Boise Cascade and overruled by Boise Cascade.
The NLRB ordered reimbursement of the refundable portion of dues, saying that it
was an improperly collected fine. The NLRB gets its remedial authority from § 10(c)
of the NLRA [29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1964)], which authorizes it to issue cease and desist
orders and to take "such affirmative action . . . as will effectuate the policies of this
Act." Reimbursement comes under this latter clause.
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hibited use of dues money and from collecting dues money for such
prohibited purposes. 42 A similar approach should govern where a
union which has established a program of benefits (such as insurance
coverage or death benefits) funded with money collected under a
security agreement decides to cut off or deny benefits to an employee
who refuses to become an actual member of the union or who, even
though an actual member, refuses to comply with a particular union
rule. In such situations, the union may be said to be putting dues
money to an improper use by, in effect, spending money to provide
benefits for some employees but not for others. The basis for the
discrimination is noncompliance with union rules, and this would
violate the proposition that benefits should be available to all employees. The NLRB, in fashioning a remedy, would seem to have a
choice of either ordering the union to cease and desist from depriving the complaining employee of his normal benefits-a remedy
which may be most desirable from the employee's viewpoint-or
ordering the union to grant restitution to the employee of the
amount of the dues apportioned to the benefits which he is being
denied. To be fully effective, of course, the NLRB's order would
for a reduction of future dues exactions by this
also have to provide
43
same percentage.
42. See notes 21-22 supra and accompanying text for support for the idea that an
injunction could be issued in this situation.
43. Id.

